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NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION'S CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENT: A SECTION 1 VIOLATION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
INTRODUCTION
Collegiate track and field athletes were denied the privilege of
participating in the 1965 San Diego trials for the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.
track meet.' This meet was sponsored by the Amateur Athletic
Union (AAU), the sole governing power in the realm of international
track and field.2 Pursuant to Article 2 of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) bylaws, the meet constituted an extra
event3 and consequently required certification by the NCAA. 4 Certi-
fication was not granted, resulting in the prohibition of all NCAA
athlete participation. The certification requirement put the NCAA
in an imperious position, by conferring upon it the authority to
determine whether or not United States collegiate track and field
athletes could compete against the Soviet Union.5
Fred Samara' participated in the 1973 Soviet Union-United
States track and field meet-an extra event that required, but did
1. The San Diego meet was sponsored by the AAU and served the purpose of selecting
the United States team that would compete against the Soviet Union. The NCAA refused
certification, but nevertheless some athletes participated. This is discussed in Hearings Be-
fore the Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate on the Controversy in Adminis-
tration of Track and Field Events in the United States, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-40, at
58-66, 27-30 (August 16, 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
2. Note, The Government of Amateur Athletics: The NCAA-AAU Dispute, 41 S. CAL.
L. REV. 464 (1968).
3. The pertinent part of the BYLAws OF THE NCAA art. 2, § 1 (1973) provides:
The functions of the Extra Events Committee shall include the certification of the
following extra events . . . postseason football contests, college all-star football and
basketball contests, track and field meets and gymnastics meets.
4. The section of the CONST. OF THE NCAA art. 3, § 9(g) (1973) that calls for certification
states:
[The athlete] shall be denied eligibility for intercollegiate track and field competi-
tion, if, while a candidate for the intercollegiate team in track and field, he partici-
pates in track and field competition which is subject to the certification program
specified in Bylaw 2, but which has not been certified.
5. Such great track and field athletes as Gerry Lingren and Tom Farrell risked their
future eligibility and competed in the event. 1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 27, 58.
6. There was another athlete from Adelphi University who was a co-plaintiff in the
action.
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not obtain, NCAA certification. Samara participated nonetheless.
His participation in the meet invoked the threat of NCAA ineligibil-
ity in any future NCAA event.7
Two DePaul University basketball players participated in a
post-season tournament which required certification pursuant to
NCAA bylaw 3-9-c. 8 The tournament was given for the benefit of
underprivileged children as part of a city-wide youth foundation
program The event was not certified. Consequently, the two ath-
letes faced the NCAA sanction of one year ineligibility in NCAA
athletic competition.10
These instances exemplify the domineering position the NCAA
commands over collegiate athletics. The oppressive certification
requirement is the instrumentality used to retain this position. If
certification is denied and a NCAA athlete participates in defiance
of the order, he risks his future collegiate eligibility in his particular
sport." Part of the problem stems from the AAU requirement pro-
hibiting dual-sanctioning of any AAU sponsored meet." But this
technicality does not make the NCAA's position any less command-
ing or the requirement any less oppressive. There have been various
7. Frederick A. Samara v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Civil No. 104-72-A
(D. Va., May 1, 1973).
8. CONST. OF THE NCAA art. 3, § 9(c) (1973). This section provides:
[The athlete] must not participate in any organized, outside basketball competition
except during the permissible playing season specified in Bylaw 3.
This section does not specifically require certification but the effect is the same.
9. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1973, § 3 (Sports) at 1.
10. Id.
11. The CONST. OF THE NCAA art. 3, § 9(c-f) (1973) enumerate the events that require
certification. For example 3(9)(f) provides:
[The athlete] shall be denied further intercollegiate athletic eligibility in all sports
if he engages as a member of a squad in any college all-star football or basketball
contest which is not certified by the Association's Extra Events Committee.
Also, the Bylaws provide the specifics of each event. It also adds postseason football contests
to the events that must be certified. See BYLAws OF THE NCAA art. 2, §§ 1-5 (1973).
12. AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION BYLAws art. 1, § 2(b) (1962).
[As] condition to the granting of an AAU sanction, the organization applying there-
for must confirm that the AAU is the sole U.S. governing body in the sport for which
sanction is applied, and must further agree that as further condition to the granting
of such sanction, such organization will neither seek nor accept sanction from any
other group or body claiming jurisdiction in such sport, nor permit athletes who are
not eligible to compete under AAU rules to compete in such sanctioned event. Pen-
alty for violation of such conditions, or any of them, shall be forfeiture of sanction if
granted.
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proposals propounded to alleviate its force.' 3 All have evidently
failed or remained sterile suggestions because the force of the re-
quirement remains, as exemplified by the recent Samara and De-
Paul University cases. The contention of this note is that the certifi-
cation requirements of the NCAA are violative of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. Such a determination would terminate its forceful and
indiscriminate application to various amateur athletic events. To
support such an allegation it is necessary to show that: (1) the
NCAA involves or affects interstate commerce; (2) the Sherman
Antitrust Act's application encompasses noncommercial activities;
(3) the certification requirement results in a restraint of interstate
trade or commerce; (4) the restraint either violates the rule of reason
or is a per se violation; and (5) there exists an injury. 4
NCAA INVOLVES OR AFFECTS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed pursuant to Congress'
plenary power under the commerce clause. It provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.'3
The application of the Antitrust Act is restricted to activities which
involve" or affect" interstate commerce." Although there has been
13. Four solutions were: (1) voluntary agreement by both parties; (2) arbitration; (3)
judicial intervention; and (4) legislation. Note, The Government of Amateur Athletics: The
NCAA-AAU Dispute, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 464, 481-90 (1968). The 1965 Hearings proposed a
moratorium between the NCAA and AAU. There also has been a bill introduced into Congress
that would alleviate the dispute.
14. Nawalanic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 97, 111 (1972).
15. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). Throughout this note reference is
made to this Act as the Sherman Antitrust Act. Unless otherwise stipulated, this use refers
only to Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Central States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 114 (D.Neb.
1960) (leasing of motion pictures was involved in interstate commerce).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (effect upon interstate commerce must be substantial and direct
to come within purview of Sherman Act); Motel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers, 195
F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Miss. 1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962) (Sherman Act applies to
activities that have direct effect upon interstate commerce).
18. Nawalnic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 97 (1972).
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a great amount of litigation and discussion of the applicability of
the Act to professional sports,'9 little has been devoted to its appli-
cation to amateur sports. Such a dearth of comment in no way
betokens an inapplicability of the Act to the NCAA.
That the Act should be applicable to the NCAA can be estab-
lished by comparing the similarity between certain activites carried
on by collegiate and professional sports alike, and observing that
such activities have been held to warrant the application of the Act
to professional athletes. Thus, in Radovich v. National Football
League,2 the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
whether professional football sufficiently involved or affected inter-
state commerce as to subject it to the provisions of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Prior to this decision, the Court had decided that
professional baseball was not within the purview of the Act.2" The
National Football League argued that since their activities were
similiar to professional baseball, they should likewise be immune
from the Act's application. The Court rejected this argument and
found that professional football acquired a "significant portion of
gross receipts. . . from the transmission of the game over radio and
television into nearly every State of the Union. ' 2 3 This activity of
professional football so affected interstate commerce as to bring it
within the purview of the Antitrust Act. Prior to this decision in
United States v. International Boxing Club,4 the Court held the
19. See; e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional
football); Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basket-
ball); U.S. v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing exhibitions); Deesen v.
Professional Golf Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966),
rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967) (professional golf); Peto v. Madison Square Garden
Corp., 1958 Trade Cas., 69,106 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (professional hockey).
20. See, e.g., Amateur Softball Ass'n v. United States, 467 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972).
.. .no authority exists which absolutely determines the question of antitrust exemp-
tion from coverage of Amateur Athletics. . .and that no court decision or legislation
is known to cover Amateur Athletics.
Id. at 315.
21. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
22. Federal Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The antitrust exemp-
tion for professional baseball was again affirmed in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), but
on different grounds. It was decided that there was a legislative intent to have a special
exemption for professional baseball. This is anamolous to all case authority on other profes-
sional sports.
23. 352 U.S. 445, 449 (1957).
24. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
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Sherman Act applicable to professional boxing. Twenty-five percent
of the total revenue of professional boxing was derived from the
interstate sale of television, radio and film rights. 5 These sales were
held to involve professional boxing in interstate commerce, thereby
making the Antitrust Act applicable.
The NCAA enjoys a substantially similar amount of revenue
from the interstate sale of television and radio rights. Every two
years the NCAA releases a proposed television schedule of the mem-
bers' various athletic events. The proposal is submitted to the mem-
ber schools for ratification and is subsequently bid upon by the
television networks. Of the income from the accepted bid the NCAA
retains 6% - the remaining 94% being allocated to the schools
participating in the televised events."6 In 1964, the NCAA received
4% (or $260,880) of the income from the sale of interstate television
rights. Although the percentage is not as great as that of boxing,
the amount is clearly significant. Further, this amount and percen-
tage did not include the revenue from sale of film or radio rights.
Combinedly, the sales activites of the NCAA must surely affect
interstate commerce. Therefore, the NCAA, like professional boxing
and football, should fall under the aegis of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by virtue of the revenue derived from the interstate sale of
television and radio rights. This is so particularly in light of the fact
that the Supreme Court in International Boxing stated that the
percentage of total revenue from the sale of interstate television,
radio and film rights was in itself enough to so involve professional
boxing in interstate commerce as to make the Sherman Antitrust
Act applicable. 8
But it is not necessary to rest the NCAA's interstate activities
solely on this basis. Interstate transportation of athletes sponsored
by the NCAA reinforces its affect upon interstate commerce. It was
25. Id. at 554. Television, radio and motion pictures have been held to involve or affect
interstate commerce. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933)
(radio); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (motion pictures); Dumont
Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (televi-
sion).
26. Interview with Richard Koenig, Secretary-Treasurer of the NCAA, September 26,
1973.
27. 1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 387.
28. 348 U.S. 236, 241 (1955).
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held in Yonker's Raceway v. Standardbred Owner's Association, 9
that the interstate transportation of race horses was sufficient to
involve the activity of harness racing in interstate commerce. 0
Horses had been transported across state lines to compete in events
conducted and sponsored by Yonker's Raceway. It is crucial to note
that the import of Yonker's is that it is not who uses the interstate
commerce lanes but the mere fact of such use that is sufficient for
a finding of interstate commerce. The NCAA conducts and spon-
sors, by itself and through its members, numerous athletic events
which incidentally and directly use these same lanes of interstate
transportation. There are 769 members of the NCAA,31 including all
fifty states, with at least thirty-one interstate collegiate athletic
conferences" that compete on a regularly scheduled basis. The ath-
letes travel across state lines to compete in athletic events con-
ducted and sponsored by the NCAA or its members. Just as harness
racing caused the interstate transportation of race horses, the
NCAA and its members cause the interstate transportation of ath-
letes. Analogous to the decision in Yonker's, this employment of
interstate transportation is adequate to involve the NCAA in inter-
state commerce.
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association 3 reinforced the
notion that sponsorship of activities which necessitate interstate
travel constitutes interstate commerce. In that case the Ladies Pro-
fessional Golf Association (LPGA) was adjudged to have conducted
its business in such a manner as to involve it in interstate com-
merce. The LPGA sponsored multi-state golf tournaments, selling
the rights for the interstate television and radio broadcasts of these
tournaments. These interstate activities were sufficient to place the
LPGA in the realm of interstate commerce.34 The NCAA engages in
the same interstate activities as the LPGA. The NCAA sponsors
multi-state athletic events3 and sells the rights for interstate radio
29. 153 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (alleged group boycott by owners of race horses
to force increase in amount of prize money).
30. Id. at 554.
31. MANUAL OF THE NCAA, 123 (1973).
32. Id. at 152-63. This was derived from a manual count. These are in constant flux
because of schools changing various conferences. But to be sure, there are about thirty-one.
33. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
34. Id. at 1263.
35. For example, the 1974 NCAA basketball finals are in North Carolina and the wres-
tling finals are in Iowa. MANUAL OF THE NCAA, 176 (1973).
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and television broadcasts. Following the precedent of Blalock, these
interstate activities of the NCAA are sufficient to place it within the
purview of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The activities of selling television and radio rights, employing
interstate travel, and sponsoring multi-state events clearly involve
the NCAA in interstate commerce. The NCAA has consequently
satisfied the interstate commerce requirement of the Antitrust Act.
NONCOMMERCIAL LIMITATION
The Sherman Antitrust Act has traditionally been applied only
to commercial enterprises." In Eastern Railroad Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight,7 the Supreme Court implicitly stated that the
Sherman Act was tailored for the business world s.3 This notion was
recently reiterated in Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle
States Association C. & S.S. , 31 where a noncommercial college accre-
ditation service was allegedly in violation of the Antitlust Act. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court stated that the thrust of the
Sherman Antitrust Act is in the commercial arena and that non-
commercial activities and organizations are outside the boundaries
of the Act." However, even if the NCAA is deemed to be a non-
commercial organization,4 it should not automatically be removed
36. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
37. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
38. Id. at 141.
39. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
40. The court stated:
[Absent] such motives, however, the process of accreditation is an activity distinct
from the sphere of commerce, it goes rather to the heart of the concept of education
itself. We do not believe that Congress intended this concept to be molded by the
policies underlying the Sherman Act.
Id. at 655.
41. An argument could be made that even though the NCAA is clothed with a noncom-
mercial title, they are in fact a commercial organization. Such a determination would extend
to the colleges and universities that comprise the membership of the NCAA. This argument
would necessarily depend on the definition of commercial contemplated by the Sherman Act.
One commentator said:
The commercialization that the court pointed to in the activities of Marjorie Webster
exists in the majority of non-profit colleges. Therefore, many hitherto unchallenged
combinations in the educational area such as athletic conferences and even the Ivy
League could conceivably come under antitrust scrutiny.
Comment, Accreditation Association's Exclusion of Profit-Making College Held to be Unrea-
sonable Restraint of Trade, Denial of Due Process, and Unlawful Conduct under Common
Law of Voluntary Associations, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1015, 1023 (1969).
1974]
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from the application of the Antitrust Act. Because of the current
proliferous expansion of service and noncommercial activities, the
trend is to bring such activities within the purview of the Act.
The purpose and effect of the Sherman Antitrust Act is to strike
at restrictions on the free competitive market.
In general, the Sherman Act embraces acts, conducts, con-
spiracies, combinations, or practices which operate to the
prejudice of the public interest by unduly restricting com-
petition or unduly restricting the due course of trade ...
The principal guide for determining whether an activity or
practice comes within the reach of the law is whether it has
or may have this prejudicial effect.2
The prime consideration is therefore the effect upon the market,
rather than a determination of the commercial complexion of the
activity.43
[Any] limitations that exempt activities categorized as
"traditionally noncommercial" or not "trade or commerce"
seriously undermine this policy.4
The NCAA is a noncommercial, nonprofit organization. But from a
pure policy standpoint, this should not protect it from the applica-
bility of the Sherman Antitrust Act. If the NCAA has a restrictive
and deleterious effect upon competition or trade, it should be within
the purview of the Sherman Act.
The extension of the Sherman Antitrust Act to noncommercial
activity not only has a solid policy foundation, but the recent trend
42. 1 Trade Reg. Rep. 620, at 1251 (FTC 1972).
43. The consideration is whether the effect upon the market is a restraint of trade or
commerce. For such a determination, it is sometimes pertinent to inquire if the plaintiff is
engaged in commerce and his trade is restrained. In Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American
Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the plaintiff's interstate trade
or commerce stemming from the care of homeless and unwanted pets was restrained by a state
and local professional society of veterinarians. Further, in State of Maryland v. Wirtz, 269
F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967), prob. juris, noted, 389 U.S. 1031 (1968), aff'd, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
the court held that commerce is not confined to "business" activity but may encompass non-
profit, non-business activities. Wirtz specifically dealt with schools. Therefore, a noncommer-
cial organization cannot only restrain trade, but it may be a noncommercial organization that
is being restrained.
44. Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-
Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 314 (1972).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7
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of case law also demands the extension. Amateur Softball Associa-
tion of America v. United States" held that since there was such a
dearth of decisions applying the Sherman Act to noncommercial
amateur athletic associations, the case should be remanded for fur-
ther investigation of this issue. The court said,
Any exemption claimed for amateur sports is, in short, one
of the issues "wholly inappropriate for this Court's determi-
nation. . . ." (citing govt. brief) . . .As to an exemption
granted to amateur athletics, if any, we conclude that many
activities not within the minds of those legislators who
drafted the Sherman Act of 1890 have more recently been
held violative.46
Prior to this decision, there were cases that applied the Sherman
Act to noncommercial activities." The court in Amateur Softball
did not follow these cases because of an unresolved interstate com-
merce issue." But subsequent to Amateur Softball, there have been
decisions that have applied the Act to noncommercial activities. In
Heldman v. United States Lawn and Tennis Association4" and
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association" the Sherman Anti-
trust Act was applied to noncommercial governing and rule-making
associations. The two athletic associations involved in these cases
were noncommercial associations that sponsored and governed their
own events. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the United
States Lawn and Tennis Association had a certification requirement
similar to that of the NCAA.5 ' It also had similar penalties for its
45. 467 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 314. The argument by the Amateur Softball Association was that since there
was an antitrust exemption for professional baseball, then the same exemption should apply
to all baseball, amateur as well as professional.
47. See, e.g., Deesen v. Professional Golf Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967) (nonprofit, rule-making,
sanctioning organization of professional golfers); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Con-
tract B.L., Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971) (rule-making,
general governing organization of contract bridge); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (rule-making, sanctioning and governing organization
of auto races).
48. 467 F.2d 312, 315 (10th Cir. 1972).
49. 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (alleged group boycott against United States
Lawn and Tennis Association because of a sanctioning requirement).
50. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (alleged group boycott by the Ladies Professional
Golf Association).
51. The rule stated:
1974]
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violation. There are other decisions both prior and subsequent to
Amateur Softball that apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to noncom-
mercial activities. Following the trend of Blalock and Heldman, the
NCAA should not be granted immunity from the Sherman Antitrust
Act solely on the determination of its noncommercial character. The
application of the Act should depend upon detrimental effects on
interstate trade or commerce, not upon mere appellation.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The force of the Sherman Antitrust Act is to prohibit the re-
straint of competition in the use of interstate avenues." If there is
no restraint or the restraint is solely upon intrastate commerce,
there is no violation of the Antitrust Act.53 The restraint must also
be direct and immediate. Incidental restrictions on interstate trade
or commerce will not result in a violation of the Act. 4 The ultimate
issue is whether, in fact, there was any direct restraint upon inter-
state commerce.5 5 By requiring certification of extra events, the
Pursuant to the standing rules and regulations of the USLTA, a Professional Player
is eligible to participate in sanctioned USLTA tournaments if that player has played
only in tournaments sanctioned by the USLTA. Should that player participate in a
non-sanctioned event, in which prize money is awarded, that player may be assigned
the status of pro contract ....
354 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52. The section that deals with individuals states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
53. Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.
1952) (the practice of the healing arts is wholly local; restraint of this activity by failure to
license did not place the licensing agency within the Antitrust Act).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 46 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1942) (agreement
to refrain from purchasing fat lambs at or close to point of production did not directly affect
interstate commerce; there was no change in movement of the lambs or change in their
prices); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 59 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 99 (3d
Cir. 1946) (bottler's refusal to sell to retailer until he met specified conditions had no direct
effect upon interstate commerce or the prices of soft drinks).
55. Martson v. Ann Arbor Property Management Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Mich.
1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970) (landlord who allegedly conspired to exclude others
from the market of student housing and allegedly fixed prices did not conduct business of an
interstate character to place it within the Sherman Act). This case is particularly interesting
because it has all the aspects of the interstate commerce argument, e.g., direct versus indi-
rect, intrastate versus interstate, price-fixing and restraint of competition market.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7
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NCAA restricts interstate commerce by imposing restraints upon:
(1) interstate transportation; (2) interstate promotion and advertis-
ing; and (3) interstate ticket sales.
In Standardbred Owner's Association v. Yonker's Raceway," an
alleged price-fixing arrangement caused a restraint on the interstate
transportation of race horses. This restraint on interstate transpor-
tation was sufficient to satisfy the restraint requirements of the
Antitrust Act.57 Similarly, the withholding of certification by the
NCAA restricts the interstate transportation of athletes. Events
that require certification are conducted in states other than where
the athletes train or reside.5" If certification is withheld, the athletes
are forbidden to compete in these events and interstate transporta-
tion of the athletes is consequently restricted. The NCAA has there-
fore caused a direct and immediate restraint upon interstate com-
merce. Just as Yonker's Raceway restricted the interstate transpor-
tation of horses,5 the NCAA's certification requirement is restrict-
ing the interstate transportation of athletes.
The non-certification of events has a second restrictive impact
on interstate commerce. The court in STP Corp. v. United States
Auto Club, Inc.6 ° noticed that businesses advertise and promote
their products in connection with particular sporting events. No
distinction was made between amateur and professional sporting
events.' A chill upon such interstate advertising and promotion
directly ensues from a denial of certification.
Most of the nation's top amateur athletes attend schools which
are members of the NCAA.2 If an extra event is not certified by the
56. 232 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1962).
57. Id. at 351. The court decided there was no price-fixing by the arrangement of purse
money. Harness racing was the type of activity that required scrutinized regulation. It was
determined that competitive market was detrimental to harness racing and public interest.
If the court decided harness racing to be applicable to a competitive market there would have
been a violation of the Sherman Act.
58. For example, athletes from various states travel to compete in NCAA certified
events such as the Drake Relays (Iowa), Kansas Relays, and Texas Relays.
59. 232 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1962).
60. 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
61. Id. at 168.
62. The NCAA athletes are different than the independent amateur athletes generally
associated with the AAU. Athletes themselves are not actually members of the NCAA. The
1974]
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NCAA, the top amateur athletes are excluded from competition.
The caliber of competition is greatly reduced and, consequently,
spectator interest in the event vanishes.
This control [the NCAA certification requirement], has
caused a number of well-known and long-established track
meets in California and other areas of the west coast to lose
much spectator interest and prestige."
This loss of interest and prestige is a direct result of the NCAA's
boycott (through its certification requirement) of various athletic
events. 4 As spectator interest decreases, ticket sales fall below prof-
itable levels. When these two factors occur, sound business practice
demands a decrease in interstate and intrastate advertising and
promotion. An event may eventually fold for lack of interest and
promotion. '5 The sports editor of the Nashville Banner said he
would assign more space and people to an event if the top athletes
could participate. He further added that he believed every newspa-
per would follow in this manner.6 By its veritable monopoly on the
top amateur athletes, the NCAA effectively determines the quantity
of interstate advertising and promotion. Non-certification restricts
interstate advertising and promotion of business commodities. It
would further restrain interstate television and radio coverage.
schools they attend are the members. The superiority of NCAA athletes and the tremendous
problems of non-certification is discussed in detail in the entire 1965 Hearings and Note, The
Government of Amateur Athletics: The NCAA-AAU Dispute, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 464 (1968).
63. 1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 68.
64. See notes 4 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
65. Research has not uncovered any particular event folding because of non-
participation by NCAA athletes. But with the decreased interest in some meets, this is the
logical extension.
66. Mr. Fred Russell, Vice President and Sports Editor of the Nashville Banner, re-
sponded to a pointed question:
SENATOR BASS. There is one question I want to ask you. Wouldn't you say, as a sports
editor, you would give much more space to a sporting event, assign more people to
it, if you knew it was an event that was sponsored, cosponsored, or sanctioned by
every organization so that all of the top athletes would be there, instead of merely a
meet that was sponsored by one group of people for its own athletes?
MR. RUSSELL. Sir, certainly we would give more space to a meet where there were
more athletes and more prominent athletes.
SENATOR BASS. And you knew that every top athlete had an opportunity to be there?
MR. RUSSELL. Yes, sir. I think that would be true with every newspaper, the more
names, the more great stars competing, certainly the bigger the story.
1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 149.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/7
NCAA CERTIFICATION
A third restraint on interstate commerce relates to the decrease
in total ticket sales precipitated by non-certification of an event. In
major events, ticket sales certainly cross interstate lines. 7 If the
NCAA refuses certification, spectator interest decreases. Reduced
spectator interest manifests itself in reduced ticket sales. A sponsor
of the 1965 Wichita track and field meet stated that one of the
reasons for lagging ticket sales could have been the NCAA's refusal
to allow a top athlete to participate. 8 Ticket sales to the Los Angeles
Coliseum Relays decreased by 12,000 because of the exclusion of the
top amateur athletes." The diminution of ticket sales has a direct
and immediate effect upon interstate travel and lodging. Since
fewer spectators travel to see the event, less motel and hotel busi-
ness is generated. 0 The decreased spectator interest in the event
may even deter the athletes themselves from participating, which
would have a corresponding effect on interstate travel and lodging.
In summary, the NCAA's denial of certification restricts inter-
state travel of athletes and spectators, restrains interstate advertis-
ing and promotion, and causes a decrease in interstate ticket sales.
These factors are sufficient to fulfill the restraint of interstate trade
or commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.
PER SE VIOLATION: GROUP BOYCOTT
Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act can occur under either
67. One only has to look at the numerous postseason football contests to see an example
of the impact of interstate ticket sales on a particular event.
68. 1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 67.
69. William M. Henry, President of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic
Games stated in 1965:
This year, because of the dispute, and our inability to stage our usual meet in which
both college and club, as well as foreign, athletes compete, our paid attendance fell
to some 18,800 who came to see a meet in which, because this is and always has been
primarily a meet between college relay teams, only college athletes participated. A
month later a similar meet in the same coliseum, which attracted not only our
country's best AAU athletes but also some of the finest and best publicized foreign
athletes, drew only slightly more than 12,000 spectators. It is my firm opinion that,
had we and the other meet enjoyed the usual combination of college and AAU and
foreign participants, each of the meets would have drawn 30,000 to 40,000 spectators,
with benefit to all concerned.
1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 72.
70. The motel business affects interstate commerce sufficiently to subject it to the
commerce power of Congress. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964).
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of two substantive theories: (1) per se violation, and (2) rule of
reason." There can be no violation of the Act apart from these
theories." The former theory will be analyzed in the present section,
and the latter in the next section.
There are a variety of activities that may result in a per se
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Individuals as well as group
activities that chill the competitive market will be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. 3 But most of the per se violations are group
activities. A special type of group per se violation is a group boycott.
A group boycott is
an implicit or explicit agreement between two or more per-
sons on one or more levels which coerces a third party to
conform to conduct desired by the combination or removes
such party from competition. 4
The effect of the group's action, rather than the intent of the group,
is the determining issue. 5 Thus, the key inquiry is the effect the
group boycott has on interstate commerce. "It is the effect of group
boycotts, not the purpose, that makes them illegal per se." 6 Be-
cause of a group boycott's relative economic control over the mar-
ket," their very existence creates a per se violation of the Sherman
71. Nawalnic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 97 (1972).
72. This is only in relation to the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, § 2 (1890) and
does not include other antitrust legislation.
73. This would include individual price-fixing and individual monopolies. This assumes
the individual has enough economic market power to effectively restrain interstate trade or
commerce. Application of the Sherman Act to the individual is encompassed in the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
74. Spitz, A Return to the Rule of Reason in Group Boycott Cases?, 42 U. COLO. L. Rv.
467, 468 (1971).
75. The scope of this note does not deal with the complicated field of when or where
there is an explicit or implicit agreement to form a contract, conspiracy or trust. Recent cases
like Blalock, Deesen and Heldman show by analogy that the NCAA, through its institutional
membership, has an implicit agreement that forms a contract, conspiracy or trust. For further
investigation in this field, see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (members
& consensus); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (subsidiary);
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 579
(1941) (implied agreement); Beacon Fruit & Prod. Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 152 F. Supp. 702
(D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. M.
Harris & Co., 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (company officers); Am. TCP Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 127
F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (subsidiary).
76. See note 74 supra at 472.
77. There are many theories on how the per se violation should be differentiated from
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Antitrust Act."8 Two cases clarifying the group boycott concept are
Kor's v. Broadway-Hale"5 and Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People." In
Klor's, a group of appliance distributors collectively refused to sell
certain appliances to the plaintiff. Their action prohibited Klor's
from competing in the appliance market. The United States Su-
preme Court deemed this action a group boycott and consequently
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Radiant Burners dealt with
an association that approved the marketability of gas burners.
Without this approval, sale of a gas burner was impossible. The
association arbitrarily refused to approve a new burner developed
by Radiant Burners, Inc. The Court found that the association's
refusal constituted a group boycott and, therefore, a per se violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
By requiring certification of extra events, the NCAA should be
held to constitute, in effect, a group boycott.8" The essence of the
group boycott in Klor's"3 and Radiant Burners4 was a group refusal
to deal, the consequences of which restrained interstate commerce
and detrimentally affected the free market. These group boycotts
either coerced third parties to conform to conduct desired by the
group or secured the third parties' removal from competition. 5 The
essential impact of the certification requirement is to dictate the
actions of amateur athletes. The certification requirement is used
to coerce the athletes to conform to the desires of the NCAA. 8 If the
the rule of reason case. One is Justice Black's view in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359
U.S. 207, 212 (1959), that group concerted refusals to deal are, without any further considera-
tion, a per se violation. The majority view is that a group boycott is illegal per se if there is a
dominance in market power over a particular activity or industry. See, Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
78. Id.
79. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
80. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
81. Another illuminating case on group boycotts as a per se violation is Fashion Origina-
tors Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1940)
(dressmakers guild activity of preventing design "piracy" was illegal per se).
82. The group or combination here is the 769 members of the NCAA. See note 75 supra
and accompanying text.
83. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
84. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
85. Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847,
875 (1955).
86. An ulterior motive for requiring certification may be to boycott all AAU events. The
certification requirement would then be used to obtain dominance in the area of amateur
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NCAA does not want one of its athletes to compete in an AAU track
and field meet, it simply refuses to certify the event. 7 Just as the
groups in Klor's and Radiant Burners, the NCAA coerces third par-
ties to act in a prescribed manner.
The NCAA also has unfettered domination in the area of certifi-
cation88 and national amateur athletics.89 The combination of this
overbearing market power ° and coercion of third party conduct
demands a finding of a group boycott. This group boycott cannot
be legitimized on a theory of promotion or review of amateur
sports.' It is the existence of the group boycott that is a per se
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the purpose or intent
of the group is of no consequence.
Klor's, Radiant Burners and most other group boycott cases
involve commercial organizations," although not all group boycotts
are comprised of commercial enterprises. They sometimes include
noncommercial organizations. Washington State Bowling Proprie-
tors Association v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.93 involved a group boycott by
a nonprofit, noncommercial bowling association. The association
used the sanctioning of its bowling tournaments to restrict bowling
in non-member establishments. Only those bowlers who bowled in
member establishments could bowl in association sponsored tourna-
athletics. This is attempted at the expense of the eligibility of the athlete. For a thorough
discussion of this conflict see generally 1965 Hearings, supra note 1.
87. This was exactly the case in the San Diego, Wichita and United States-Soviet Union
track meets.
88. BYLAws OF THE NCAA art. 2, § 1 (1973).
89. Note, The Government of Amateur Athletics: The NCAA-AAU Dispute, 41 S. CAL.
L. REV. 464 (1968).
90. See, e.g., Apex Hoisery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Johnson v. J.H. Yost
Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941).
91. Courts do not look to the purpose of the activity of the associations. See, e.g.,
Fashion Originators Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S.
457 (1940) (association's purpose to prevent stealing of original designs did not remove it from
purview of the Sherman Act); Truxes v. Rolan Elec. Corp., 314 F. Supp. 752 (D.P.R. 1970)
(association's refusal to deliver wire to plaintiffs cannot be saved from the Sherman Act by
allegations that it is reasonable under specific conditions).
92. For cases dealing with group boycotts, see, e.g., Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948) (refiner of beet sugar by its price-fixing was a group boycott); United States
v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) (association's agreement to employ only
those contractors who were unionized or members of a specified trade association was a group
boycott).
93. 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
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ments. The association contended that their actions were necessary
to insure proper bowling conditions. 4 The association was found to
have engaged in a group boycott. Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf
Association 5 dealt with a group boycott conducted by a noncom-
mercial, rule-making association." Heldman v. United States Lawn
and Tennis Association7 also applied the group boycott concept to
a noncommercial organization that engaged in sanctioning non-
association tennis events. Application of group boycotts should not
be confined to commercial organizations, but should extend to any
activity that evidences the characteristics of a group boycott. Since
the NCAA has the characteristics of a group boycott, they should
be held to constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.
RULE OF REASON: VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST ACT
The rule of reason, being an alternative approach to the group
boycott, the absence of a group boycott violation does not preclude
the possibility of a rule of reason violation. A rule of reason violation
of the Antitrust Act involves a determination as to the reasonable-
ness of a restraint on commerce. 8 To determine the reasonableness
of the restraint, a court will look to the intent of the organization's
activities and their ultimate effect upon interstate trade or com-
merce. 9 This is the basic difference between the rule of reason and
94. Id. at 376.
95. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
96. The case may be distinguished because part of the organization that expelled Blal-
ock was comprised of her own competitors. This was one of the determining factors of the
case. But the case remains to exemplify that group boycotts as per se violations are applicable
to noncommercial organizations.
97. 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court never got to the question of group
boycotts because the plaintiff failed to show the essential elements for injunctive relief. The
dispositive issue was not application of group boycotts to a noncommercial organization, but
inferentially the court made this application.
98. An extensive look into the multi-faceted rule of reason is beyond the scope of this
note. For a more involved study of this concept, see Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918) (rule of reason applied to the grain market); United States v. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (rule of reason first propounded); Molinas v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (auto racing association's rules of type of car were not
unreasonable); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
99. Nawalanic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust Laws, 21 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 97 (1972).
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the group boycott approaches; the court will go beyond the effect
and look to intent in the former, but not in the latter. If the intent
of the organization is not to restrain commerce and there is a justifi-
able reason for the corresponding restriction, then under the rule of
reason theory there is no violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The decisive question is whether the restraint is an unrea-
sonable restraint. This depends, in essence, on the signifi-
cance of the restraint in relation to a particular industry.100
For example, in Bounds v. Eastern College Athletic
Conference,0' a conference requirement that a student transferring
from a junior college have at least forty-eight transferrable credit
hours of work to compete in athletics was not considered arbitrary.
Although there may have been a restraint on trade by such a regula-
tion,' 2 the court declined to subject the athletic conference to the
Antitrust Act. It felt that there were justifiable and compelling rea-
sons for the existence of the rule, which made the rule unarbitrary
and the corresponding restraint reasonable.
Application of the rule of reason to the NCAA presumes the
absence of a group boycott,'03 since its presence obviates an investi-
gation into the reasonableness of the restraint of trade. To apply the
rule of reason theory to the NCAA, the pertinent inquiry is whether
the certification requirement causes an unreasonable restraint upon
interstate commerce. This inquiry narrows itself to determining the
reasonableness of the certification requirement. If the certification
requirement fails in its objectives, then clearly it is unreasonable.
There are four general reasons why the NCAA feels it necessary to
maintain the certification requirement: (1) to insure proper condi-
tions of events or meets for the athlete's physical and mental well-
being;0 14 (2) to insure and protect the amateur status of the event
100. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (newspaper wireservice viola-
tion of Sherman Act).
101. 330 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1972).
102. Id. at 455. The court never addressed itself to the issue of restraint of trade, but
was satisfied with its determination of the reasonableness of the rules.
103. This is presumed only for the purpose of discussion. The NCAA is clearly a group
boycott and therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
104. Senator Dominick stated:
My point is that the reason, as I understand it, for the objection by the NCAA to a
sole sanctioning of a meet by AAU is that the NCAA is not sure that the AAU will
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7
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and the athlete himself;' °0 (3) to insure that the athletes are "in
shape;"'0 6 and (4) to prohibit economic exploitation through use of
the athlete's talents. 01
It is one of the functions of the NCAA Extra Events Committee
to certify specified events prescribed in the bylaws of the NCAA.'
0 8
It is, however, important to observe that not all amateur athletic
events demand certification. Certification is required only for post-
season football contests, college all-star football and basketball
contests, track and field, and gymnastics.' 9 In addition, the NCAA
Council predetermines the number of postseason football contests
that will be granted certification. ' 0 This number is determined
without any real concern for the expressed purposes of the certifica-
tion requirement. These two limitations mitigate, if not totally de-
feat, the fulfillment of the objectives of requiring certification. Com-
plete satisfaction of the objectives requires certification of all extra
events in all sports. The preservation of amateur status for a colle-
maintain proper conditions for college athletes-that is preserve their amateur sta-
tus, protect their academic interests, and promote their physical well-being.
1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 23.
105. Id.
106. The 1965 Athletic Director of the University of Southern California stated in re-
sponse to a question from the Commerce Committee:
Because during the summer months the boys are competing in track meets, the
coach, his track coach is not around, he competes in meets over which we have no
control whatever, the types of competition, the dangers involved with competing in
events sometimes that he is not in condition to compete in.
I have known of occasions, not specifically, where boys were injured in the
summer months competing in events when they were not in shape to do it. And we
feel that during the summer months that if we have some control, some type of
situation where we do have the surveillance of them during the summer months, that
we can eliminate their competition in meets, let's say, that are privately promoted,
that are not properly conducted, that are not properly managed, not properly offici-
ated at times.
1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 114.
107. This is the objective the NCAA stressed the most. They want to prevent financial
gain by promoters at the expense of the athletes. This was a particularly pervasive problem
with a Michigan basketball player. Interview with Richard Koenig, Secretary-Treasurer of
the NCAA, September 26, 1973.
108. BYLAWS OF THE NCAA art. 2 § 1 (1973).
109. Id. CONST. OF THE NCAA art. 3 § 9(c)(D) adds outside, organized basketball compe-
tition and soccer to the events that require certification.
110. The pertinent section provides, "The number of contests to be certified each year
by the Association shall be determined and announced by the NCAA Council." BYLAWS OF
THE NCAA art. 2 § 2(m) (1973).
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giate baseball player is certainly as important as a track and field
athlete. The economic exploitation of collegiate wrestlers is no less
important than collegiate basketball players. Yet the NCAA does
not require certification for outside baseball and wrestling events.",
The unreasonableness of the certification requirement manifests it-
self more clearly with regard to the athletes' physical condition. A
legitimate concern for the physical condition of amateur athletes
would demand certification in all extra events. The physical condi-
tion of a postseason football player is certainly no more important
than that of a wrestler or baseball player, yet the NCAA does not
require certification for extra events in wrestling and baseball. " 2
The limited number of events requiring certification only serve
to defeat the objectives of the certification requirement. The ulti-
mate purposes of certification have no peculiar application to those
particular events which necessitate certification. Rather, the pur-
poses apply with equal weight to all amateur sporting events. Since
the requirement of certification is arbitrary, the goals of certifica-
tion given by the NCAA seem little more than excuses to exert
unreasonable control over college athletes.
The unreasonableness of the certification requirement mani-
fests itself upon a closer look at some of the particular objectives.
One purpose for requiring certification is to insure that events are
conducted under proper conditions.13 This would include such
things as timing mechanisms in track and field, acceptable training
and medical facilities, and the protection of academic interests."'
Theoretically, certification would be denied if conditions fail to
meet the NCAA's minimum standards, but in practice this is not
always true. Certification was not granted to the San Diego, Wich-
ita" 5 or United States-Soviet Union"' track meets despite their rep-
utation for maintaining adequate conditions."' If the certification
111. BYLAws OF THE NCAA art. 2 § 1 (1973).
112. Id.
113. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
114. 1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 104.
115. See generally 1965 Hearings, supra note 1.
116. Frederick A. Samara v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Civil No. 104-72-A (D. Va.,
May 1, 1973).
117. The San Diego meet was conducted by the AAU to qualify to compete against the
Russians in Kiev. The Wichita meet was a general meet sponsored by Station KTVH of
Wichita. Track meets of this importance had to maintain adequate conditions to be recog-
nized in the important capacity they were acting.
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requirement was in fact based upon the goals espoused by the
NCAA, all of those events would have been certified. Instead, certi-
fication was denied only because the AAU prohibits the dual-
sanctioning of events it sponsors. '8 In the above instance, therefore,
the NCAA's certification requirement did not meet the objective of
insuring adequate conditions.
Another purpose for requiring certification is the legitimate
need to preclude economic exploitation of amateur athletic talents
by unscrupulous promoters, "9 who would exploit college athletes for
their own pecuniary gain. This exploitation may even manifest itself
in the possibility of the athletes accepting money for participating
in an event. But in practice, certification is withheld for arbitrary
reasons other than the prevention of economic exploitation. 20 There
was no vestige of economic exploitation in a Gary, Indiana basket-
ball tournament that was conducted for underprivileged children.
Nonetheless, the NCAA refused certification'' even though no evi-
dence of illegal financial gain was ever presented. Similarly, the
NCAA withheld certification for the San Diego and Wichita track
meets1 2 despite the absence of financial gain by unscrupulous pro-
moters. Since certification is withheld from events where economic
exploitation is clearly absent, the application of the certification
requirement is unreasonable and arbitrary.
The NCAA's certification requirement is a violation of the rule
118. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
119. Everett D. Barnes, President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association and
Athletic Director, Colgate University in 1965, expounded this objective to the Commerce
Committee.
QUESTION 9. Why does the NCAA and/or the USTFF feel that it is necessary to
sanction competition conducted by other than its own constituency (AAU or any
other private or outside promotional source)?
ANSWER. Because, traditionally, the schools and colleges have always felt and met
the responsibility and obligation to examine the conditions of competition of their
enrolled student-athletes in order to prevent improper exploitation by individuals or
groups primarily interested in financial gain for themselves and to guarantee as
nearly as possible standards of competition equal to those conducted by the schools
and colleges themselves.
1965 Hearings, supra note 1, at 396.
120. Certification is sometimes withheld not because of the pursuit of any of the pro-
posed objectives, but because of the AAU restriction on dual-sanctioning. See note 12 supra
and accompanying text.
121. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1973, § 3 (Sports) at 1.
122. See generally 1965 Hearings, supra note 1.
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of reason theory. The requirement does not act to prevent economic
exploitation or insure the maintenance of proper event conditions.
Nor can it be justified, as shown above, by the objectives of preserv-
ing amateur status and insuring that the athletes are "in shape."
The decisive question for the rule of reason test is "whether the
restraint is an unreasonable restraint.' ' 23 Since the objectives for
the requirement are not fulfilled, its application is unreasonable and
arbitrary. The restraint of trade effectuated by the certification is
therefore unreasonable.
INJURY
The final component in an antitrust action is proof of damages.
There are two possible remedies that involve such proof, treble dam-
ages' 4 and injunctive relief.' Recovery of treble damages requires
some proof of pecuniary loss or damage, whereas injunctive relief
requires proof of irreparable harm, 26 which does not necessarily con-
sist of monetary damages.
Proof to a mathematical certainty of the actual damages is not
required for treble damage recovery,' " but there must at least be a
showing of some injury in fact.' 28 Purely speculative monetary dam-
123. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
124. The pertinent section provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
125. The pertinent section provides in part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the par-
ties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . .
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1914).
126. There are other requirements that must be satisfied for the granting of injunctive
relief. Proof of irreparable harm is not the sole criterion. See note 136 infra.
127. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.
1972).
128. Image and Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass.
1956).
• . . There must nevertheless be some basis for computing the amount of damages
which the plaintiff claims to have sustained. He cannot recover on the strength only
of his allegations of hypothetical losses of speculative and anticipatory earnings . ..
Id. at 239.
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ages will not sustain an antitrust action. New issues increasingly
arise in antitrust litigation which give rise to novel sources of injury,
which consequently broaden the avenues of the proof required to
show injury. "A court . . . should utilize a more liberal approach
because of the relation between antitrust laws and possible new
sources of injury."'25 Pollution was one such area that expanded the
damage concept.'3 0 In a California case, the plaintiffs contended
that their business and property would be damaged by the automo-
bile manufacturer's failure to comply with requirements for installa-
tion of pollution control devices. This was a class action - the class
being composed of the general public and individual homeowners
who had no particular commercial connection with the automobile
manufacturer. Rather than dismissing the action because of specu-
lative damages, a California District Court allowed the plaintiffs the
opportunity to prove their damages in court. Damage to the home-
owner's business and property from automobile pollution is clearly
speculative, yet the court recognized the liberalization of the proof
requirements.
Monetary damages to collegiate athletes by imposition of the
certification requirement is broad and speculative. This pecuniary
damage would diminish the opportunity for a professional contract.
College athletics entails big business. 3' Maximum public exposure
and notoriety is essential for the college athlete to acquire adequate
opportunity for a professional contract. The certification require-
ment seriously restricts the athlete's exposure, since he can partici-
pate in only those extra events that are certified. Since this restric-
tion "injures amateur athletes by limiting their opportunities to
compete, gain exposure, and bargain for professional contract, 1'32
129. Comment, Private Antitrust Actions Against Air Pollutors-Commercial Relation-
ship Between Litigants Not Necessary to Maintain an Action for Violation of Section 1 of
Sherman Act, 24 VAND. L. REV. 126, 129 (1970). This article deems that a class action without
any commercial relationship is a new era in private antitrust suits. It further contends this
will be an effective enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
130. In re Multi-District Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,317, at 89,254 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970) (court allowed a private class action for alleged
injury to business and property from delay in installation in pollution control devices in cars).
131. Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1971) (the big
business of collegiate athletics is noted).
132. Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and other "Non-
Commercial Activities", 82 YALE L.J. 313, 330 (1972).
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the court should recognize this monetary damage. There is no assur-
ance that a collegiate athlete will obtain a large professional con-
tract. Indeed, only a small minority of the collegiate athletes attain
this time-honored goal. Yet this loss is no more speculative than the
monetary damage to a homeowner's property from pollution. The
basis for both are elusive and speculative. Yet, following the reason-
ing of the pollution case, the courts should at least allow the athlete
the opportunity to prove his damages.
Admittedly, the opportunity of the collegiate athletes for re-
covering treble damages is a remote remedy and may not be ac-
cepted by the less progressiye courts. But the athlete is not confined
to obtaining monetary relief, for he may obtain injunctive relief. 33
Injunctive relief "is to be used to protect the private plaintiffs
against future conduct threatening them with loss or damage."',
To obtain injunctive relief, the athlete must show that he (1)
has a clear right to relief; (2) damage to him is irreparable; and (3)
the remedy at law is inadequate to prevent a failure of justice. 3 The
clear right to relief is satisfied by a violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. The irreparable harm and inadequate remedy at law are
interdependent factors. "Irreparable damage is suffered when mon-
etary damages are difficult to ascertain or are inadequate."'3 Inade-
quate remedy at law is also satisfied when monetary compensation
is insufficient to compensate the party for the inflicted injuries.
Both factors are satisfied if the monetary damages are inadequate
or incalculable. If the court fails to grant treble damages because
they are too speculative, the athlete is led to injunctive relief. A
court will consider the speculativeness of monetary damages in its
determination of whether the harm is irreparable. 37
133. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1914).
134. Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 1967
UTAH L. REv. 344, 362 (1967).
135. Czarrich v. Loup Riou Public Power District, 190 Neb. 521 (1973), 209 N.W.2d 595
(1973). The court said:
It is fundamental that an injunction will not be granted unless the (1) right is clear;
(2) the damage is irreparable, and; (3) the remedy at law is inadequate to prevent a
failure of justice.
Id. at 526, N.W.2d at 598.
136. Danielson v. Local 275, Laborers Int'l Union of North America, 479 F.2d 1033, 1037
(2nd Cir. 1973).
137. Id.
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By imposing the ineligibility sanction of the certification re-
quirement, injury to the amateur athlete is not confined to inade-
quate opportunity for professional contracts. It also includes the loss
of prestige, honor, glory, and most importantly the thwarting of his
athletic talents and even partial loss of the benefits of years of
training. Adequate monetary compensation for the loss of these in-
tangibles is impossible, for one cannot determine the value of ath-
letic talents, the honor and glory of collegiate athletics, and the
years of training. Since the athlete cannot adequately be compen-
sated with monetary damages, he should be granted a permanent
injunction.'38 An example of the application of the requirements for
injunctive relief is Flood v. Kuhn, 31 where an injunction was denied
because of the failure to show irreparable harm. The court reasoned
that there was no threat of immediate injury to Flood. Rather the
harm to Flood was inflicted by Flood himself, since it was his choice
not to play baseball and not the dictate of the baseball league. The
NCAA certification requirement poses the converse situation, for
irreparable harm to the collegiate athlete is definitely present. Un-
like the Flood case where the injury was self-inflicted, the athletes
are forced by the NCAA to refrain from competing in non-certified
events. If they defy the order, they face future ineligibility in their
particular sport. Since the athletes are forced not to compete in non-
certified events, irreparable harm is present, and a permanent in-
junction should be granted. 4 '
If the amateur athlete cannot sustain a treble damages action
against the NCAA because of a judicial belief in the inherent specu-
lativeness of monetary damages, he should definitely be granted a
138. There is a procedural difference between the granting of a preliminary and a
permanent injunction. A preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a trial
for a permanent injunction. It is granted on the sufficiency of the pleadings. A permanent
injunction is granted only after a trial on the merits of the case. The granting of a permanent
injunction requires a preponderance of the evidence. See Cloud v. Dyers, 277 Ala. 508, 512,
172 So.2d 528, 513 (1965).
139. 309 F. Supp. 793 (1970), aff'd 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
140. It is important to note that injunctions are generally granted where there is an
established personal or property right. See Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110,
180 P.2d 321 (1947). In other words, there must be an established right that is being threat-
ened or infringed in order for equity to grant relief. A discussion of the legal right of the
collegiate athlete.is beyond the scope of this topic. But it is established that the athlete would
be deprived of his right to association and his right to interstate travel would also be infringed
by the imposition of the certification requirement.
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permanent injunction enjoining the NCAA from imposing both the
certification requirement and any disciplinary action that may have
been dictated for violation of an NCAA non-certification order. For
the athlete, injunctive relief would be the more desirable remedy.
Practically, he is more concerned with competing in the athletic
events than obtaining pecuniary gain at the expense of the NCAA.
CONCLUSION: A REVISED RULE
By requiring certification, the NCAA has satisfied the five re-
quirements for an antitrust violation, but the certification require-
ment should not be abolished in its entirety. While it may be seri-
ously questioned whether there is any need for a parens patriae
organization to insure adequate conditions in an event, it is cer-
tainly not necessary to have an organization determine whether an
athlete's physical condition is or is not satisfactory. There is a defi-
nite need to have an organization that would prevent economic
exploitation and to protect the amateur status of athletes.
The ultimate purpose behind any certification program should
be to attain the greatest possible benefit to the athlete. This goal
could not be accomplished by indiscriminate and arbitrary denial
of certification. 4' Nor can it be accomplished if certification is used
as a tool to retain dominance over competing amateur athletic
groups.'42 The ultimate objective must be the athlete's welfare. Col-
legiate athletes are mature enough to determine whether they are
"in shape." Further, although the assurance of adequate event con-
ditions is a somewhat worthy goal, the decision to compete should
be left to the individual athlete. More often than not, from his close
141. The arbitrary application of the certification requirement is most clearly exempli-
fied in the De Paul University basketball player case. The tournament satisfied all the
requirements in order to avoid the imposition of the NCAA sanction. Yet the players were
threatened with ineligibility. The particular rule that applied to the De Paul case did not
expressly require certification, but the NCAA treats the situations in the exact same way.
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1973 § 3 (Sports), at 1,3.
142. It is suggested that one of the motives for invoking the certification requirement
is to boycott all AAU sponsored events in an effort to gain dominance of government of
amateur athletics. The AAU has a sanctioning requirement refusing to allow dual-sanctioning
of any AAU sponsored event. The obvious import of the AAU rule is to exclude the NCAA
from any AAU sponsored event. This insures that the NCAA does not encroach on the AAU's
area of amateur athletics. The NCAA in turn may use the certification requirement to boycott
all AAU events that may encroach on their field of amateur athletics. See generally 1965
Hearings, supra note 1.
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association with the event, the athlete has greater knowledge of the
event's conditions. Maximum welfare and benefit to the athlete
would be obtained by an organization that insures the amateur
standing of the event and protects the athlete from economic exploi-
tation by unscrupulous promoters. Only for these latter two reasons
should the NCAA require and enforce a certification requirement.
In today's era of large professional contracts and the thriving
of collegiate sports,'43 there is a definite need for some overview and
policing of amateur events. The individual athletes do not have the
facilities necessary to investigate each event. The NCAA with its
virtual dominance in national amateur athletics is adequately
equipped to perform this investigatory function. However, investi-
gation should not be confined to a specified few events."' Rather the
NCAA should investigate all extra events. A program that would
prevent the participation of athletes in any event that would injure
amateur status or lead to economic exploitation would protect the
athletes and collegiate sports in general. The NCAA should there-
fore have a certification program that would insure this result. They
should especially refrain from denying certification based on the
physical condition of the athlete or the conditions of the event.
These latter two criteria should be left to the athlete's determina-
tion.
This revised certification requirement would fulfill two impor-
tant objectives. First, athletes would not be restricted from partici-
pating in events. They would be able to gain greater exposure to
increase the possibility of large professional contracts while main-
taining the worthy goals of amateurism. It would further increase
the development of athletic talents by allowing greater experience
in competitive situations. Secondly, this would be an effective and
thorough check on the amateur standing and economic exploitation
of the athlete. The suggested revision would comply with the dic-
tates of the Sherman Antitrust Act' and allow the greatest possible
development of the athletic talents with a minimum amount of
restrictions.
143. Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1971).
144. For the specific events see, CONST. OF THE NCAA art. 3, § 9 (1973).
145. Since the NCAA would only indirectly restrain trade because of the limited scope
of the certification requirement, they would not come within the purview of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). Even if they did restrain trade, the rules would be
reasonable so as to bypass the test of the rule of reason.
1974]
et al.: National Collegiate Athletic Association's Certification Requirem
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/7
